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The Starboard Hand Rule Under the 1972
Collision Regulations
NICHOLAS J. HEALY* AND JOSEPH C. SWEENEY**
I
INTRODUCTION
Of the three basic navigational situations-head-on, overtaking and
crossing-the crossing situation is the most inherently dangerous,
and accounts for a substantially greater number of clear weather
2
collisions than either of the others.' The basic starboard hand rule,
requiring a power-driven vessel on the port side in a crossing situation
with another power-driven vessel to keep out of the way of the vessel
on the starboard side, originated soon after steam propulsion became
common. It was introduced in the 1863 United Kingdom Regulations,
drawn up by the British Board of Trade in consultation with the
French Government and was adopted by more than 30 maritime
countries, including the United States, by the end of 1864.3 In the
United States the 1864 and 1885 Regulations required the starboard
hand vessel to hold her course, but did not provide that she must
maintain her speed, nor did they stipulate that the port hand vessel
must avoid crossing ahead. Both vessels had the duty to slow, stop
4
and reverse, if necessary.

*Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University; former Editor and now Member of the
Board of Editors, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
**Professor of Law, Fordham University; Member of the Board of Editors, Journal of

Maritime Law & Commerce.
This article is an excerpt from a treatise on the Law of Collision to be published by Cornell
Maritime Press, Inc., Centreville, Md., with whose permission the excerpt is published here.
'See F. Bassett and R. Smith, Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road 255 (6th ed. 1982).
15. For ready reference, Rules 15, 16 and 17 are reprinted at the end of this article.
See Cockcroft & Lameijer, Collision Avoidance Rules 14 (3d ed. 1982); Marsden,
Collisions
at Sea 552 (K. McGufflie Ed., 11th ed. 1961).
4
Rules 19, 21 and 23 of the 1864 Rules, as re-enacted in 1874. See Griffin, The American
Law of Collision 809 (1949) (hereinafter cited as "Grifin"); Articles 16, 18 and 22 of the 1885
Rules, id. at 819-820.
2
Rule
3
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Rule 19 of the 1897 International Regulations required the port
hand vessel in a crossing situation involving risk of collision to keep
out of the way; Rule 22 required her to avoid crossing ahead of the
starboard hand vessel if the circumstances admitted; and Rule 21
required the latter to hold her speed as well as her course. 5 These
rules were essentially left unchanged under the Regulations of 1910,
1948 and 1960, and their substance is now contained in Rules 15, 16,
17(a)(i) and 17(b) of COLREGS and the Inland Rules.
The starboard hand vessel was formerly called the "privileged"
vessel and the port hand vessel the "burdened" vessel, and some
judges so describe them even today. 6 The term "privileged," however, is a misnomer: both vessels are in fact "burdened," since the
starboard hand vessel's primary obligation to hold course and speed
is just as much a "burden" as is the port hand vessel's primary
obligation to keep out of the other vessel's way. The COLREGS and
Inland Rules designations, "stand-on" and "give-way," are much
more appropriate than "privileged" and "burdened."
II
APPLICABILITY OF THE STARBOARD HAND RULE
For the starboard hand rule to apply, several conditions must exist:
(a) The vessels must be in visual sight of one another; as in head-on
and overtaking situations, the steering and sailing rules do not apply
in a crossing situation when the vessels can "see" each other only on
their respective radar screens. 7 However, once they do become
actually visible to each other, e.g., when a snow storm is over, or the
vessels emerge from a fog bank, the starboard hand rule will apply, if
the distance then separating the vessels is sufficient to permit navigation in accordance with the rule.8 If the distance is not sufficient,
the case is one of special circumstances and Rule 2 will apply.
5
The
6

1897 Rules are reprinted in full in Griffin, supra note 4, at 645-680.
See, e.g., Trinidad Corp. v. The Keiyoh Maru, 845 F.2d 818, 1989 AMC 627 (9th Cir. 1988);
American Employers Ins. Co. v. The Menelaus, 1982 AMC 654 (E.D. La. 1980); Zim Israel
Nay. Co. v. Special Carriers Inc., 611 F. Supp. 581, 1986 AMC 2016 (E.D. La. 1985).
7
COLREGS Rule I I provides that "Rules in this Section [Rules 11-18] apply to vessels in
sight of one another." Inland Rule I I is identical, except that "Subpart" is used in place of
"Section." Rule 30) of COLREGS and the Inland Rules provides that "Vessels shall be

deemed in sight of one another only when one can be observed visually from the other." See
Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392, 1951 AMC 1701 (9th Cir. 1951); The California-The Curlew,
105 F. Supp. 428, 1952 AMC 508 (D. Mass. 1952).
Srhe E.R. Wallonia, [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 485 (Q.B., Adm. Ct. 1987).
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(b) A risk of collision must be involved. Thus, if the vessels are so
far apart when they become visible to each other that there is no risk
of collision, each is free to maneuver in such a way as to avoid a close
quarters situation.9
(c) The vessels must be underway, and at least one of them must
have way on. The starboard hand rule has been applied in several
cases where the port hand vessel was drifting and the starboard hand
vessel had way on.' 0 It has likewise been applied where the starboard
hand vessel was drifting and the port hand vessel had way on."
(d) If the starboard hand vessel has way on she must be on a steady
course and be maintaining a steady speed, so that the port hand vessel
is able to ascertain her movements. However, this does not mean that
there may not be changes in the starboard hand vessel's heading, or
even in her engine speed. Thus, she may be on a "curved" course, in
order to follow the curvature of a river or channel,12 or the helmsman
may have to make minor changes in heading to compensate for
yawing in a rough sea. Likewise, when it is clear that the stand-on
vessel is engaged in a maneuver which requires alterations in engine
speed, it is not a violation of her obligation to maintain her speed if
she continues to make such alterations. Thus, a ferryboat on the
starboard hand in a crossing situation may follow her usual practice
of slowing when entering her slip. 13
As stated by Lord Alverstone in The Roanoke:14
In my judgment, "course and speed" in art. 21 [now Rule 17] mean
course and speed in following the nautical manoeuvre in which, to the
knowledge of the other vessel, the vessel is at the time engaged. It is not
difficult to give many instances which support this view. The "course"
certainly does not mean the actual compass direction of the heading of
the vessel at the time the other is sighted.
9

The Plumleaf, 7 LI. L. Rep. 207 (C.A. 1921).
1'°The Umbria, 153 F. 851 (2d Cir. 1907); The City of Camden, 44 F.2d 711, 1930 AMC 1822
(3d Cir. 1930); The Broomfield, 10 Asp. Mar. Cas. 194 (Prob. 1905). See Griffin at 113-114.
"The Cyclops, 45 F. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The N.Y.C. No. 18,230 F. 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1916).
12Commonwealth & Dominion Line v. United States, 20 F.2d 729, 731, 1927 AMC 1690,
1692-93 (2d Cir. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 278 U.S. 427, 1929 AMC 238 (1929); cf. The
Alcoa Rambler, 82 LI. L. Rep. 359 (P.C. 1948).
13The Bronx, 250 F. 843 (2d Cir. 1918). See also Griffin at 145, quoting Judge Learned Hand's

statement in The Napoli, 1928 AMC 97 (2d Cir. 1920), that if the starboard hand vessel has been
proceeding at a varied speed she should "keep varying that speed as before ....

So I think that

'keeping her speed' means keeping the apparent variation of speed, not changing it to a constant
velocity."
14(1908) Prob. Div. 231, 239. See also Commonwealth & Dominion Line, supra note 12;
United States v. The Soya Atlantic, 330 F.2d 732, 737, 1964 AMC 898 (4th Cir. 1964).
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• . .A vessel bound to keep her course and speed may be obliged to
reduce her speed to avoid some danger of navigation, and the question
must be in each case "Is the manoeuvre in which the vessel is engaged
an ordinary and proper manoeuvre in the course of navigation which
will require an alteration of course and speed; ought the other vessel to
be aware of the manoeuvre which is being attempted to be carried
out?"

A recent example of a case where the starboard hand rule was
found inapplicable is Trinidad Corp. v. The Keiyoh Maru.1 5 The S.S.
Fort Worth was proceeding in the southbound coastal shipping lane,
heading into Los Angeles, while the M.T. Keiyoh Maru was leaving
the neighboring port of Long Beach. As the Keiyoh Maru passed
through the Long Beach breakwater entrance the harbor pilot conning the ship radioed the pilot boat to come alongside to pick him up.
This was done, and the Keiyoh Maru then sailed through a restricted
anchorage and attempted to cut across the bow of the Fort Worth,
from starboard to port. Unlike the Keiyoh Maru, under the applicable
U.S. Coast Guard rules, the Fort Worth was entitled to be in the
restricted area, since she was intending to enter Los Angeles harbor.
The Fort Worth ordered full astern and sounded a five-blast warning
signal. No evasive action was taken by the Keiyoh Maru, whose port
bow tore into the bow of the Fort Worth.
The Keiyoh Maru contended that she was the stand-on vessel in a
crossing situation, and that the Fort Worth, as the give-way vessel,
was obliged to keep out of her way. The district court ruled, however,
that the starboard hand rule was inapplicable, and the court of
appeals affirmed, stating:
In order to be considered a privileged vessel in a crossing situation, it
must be on a steady course. "A ship is on a steady course, not only
when her heading does not change, but whenever her future positions
are certainly ascertainable from her present position and movements."
Commonwealth & Dominion Line v. United States, 20 F.2d 729, 731,
1927 AMC 1690, 1692 (2d Cir. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 278 U.S.
427,429, 1929 AMC 238,239 (1929); see also United States v. S.S. Soya
Atlantic, 330 F.2d 732, 737, 1964 AMC 898, 906 (4th Cir. 1964). The
district court found that the Keiyoh Maru's navigation did not satisfy
this test. The district court said: "Due to the constantly changing
engine orders and constantly changing headings of the Keiyoh Maru,
the Keiyoh Maru never established itself on a constant course and
speed in a crossing situation with the Fort Worth." Moreover, the
Keiyoh Maru's course could not possibly be characterized as "certain15845 F.2d 818, 1989 AMC 627 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ly ascertainable" because of her movement through the restricted
anchorage area. The Fort Worth was entitled to assume that another
vessel would not transgress a restricted area and embarrass its passage.
The district court was correct in finding that no crossing situation
existed. The Fort Worth had, therefore, no duty to stay clear of the
Keiyoh Maru.

III
HEAD-ON AND CROSSING DISTINGUISHED
Under Rule 14(b) a head-on situation is deemed to exist "when a
vessel sees the other ahead or nearly ahead and by night could see the
masthead lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line and/or both
sidelights and by day she observes the corresponding aspect of the
other vessel." Thus, under ordinary circumstances, when danger of
collision exists, if at night both the red and green lights of a vessel
ahead are visible, it is a head-on situation, whereas if only one side
light can be seen, it is a crossing situation.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 14 provides that if in any doubt as to whether
a head-on situation exists a vessel must assume that it does, and act
accordingly. Therefore, if a vessel is not certain whether she is a
starboard hand vessel required to hold course in a crossing situation
or whether she should turn to starboard to effect a safe port to port
passing as required of both vessels in a head-on situation, she should
turn to starboard.
If two vessels were literally meeting head-on, their headings would
of course be 1800 apart. Several decisions have attempted to distinguish between head-on and crossing situations in terms of the
difference in degrees between the reciprocal courses of the two
vessels. These decisions have not been entirely consistent, but the
weight of authority appears to be that if both side lights of each vessel
are visible more than half a point, or about 60, on the other's bow, it
is a crossing, and not a head-on situation.
After citing The Gulf Stream1 6 and The Kaituna17 Griffin states:

While there is singularly little direct authority on the subject, the
foregoing cases would seem to indicate that, if one has the other half a
point on her starboard bow and is herself half a point on the other's port
bow, the divergence is not sufficient to take the case out of Article 18
[corresponding to COLREGS Rule 14] (but cf. the Koning Willem II,
(1908) Prob. Div. 125, 131), but that, if either has the other more than
1643 F. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (Addison Brown J.).
1744 Li. L. Rep. 71 (Adm. 1932), modified, 46 LI. L. Rep. 200 (C.A. 1933).
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half a point on the bow, the case is one of crossing vessels. This view
would seem consistent with the rule for night, which depends on the
sidelights (the Grand Republic, 16 Fed. 424, 426 (1883)). A properly
screened sidelight should not show more than half a point across the
bow (the Edwin Slick, 286 Fed. 43, 47 (1923); the Thingvalla, 48 Fed.
764, 769 (1891), and half a point is, therefore, the limit at which both
sidelights would be displayed to the other vessel. If one vessel has the
other more than half a point on the starboard bow, and therefore is
showing her green light only to the other's red or red and green, it is a
crossing situation. The same result should follow by day in similar
situations. 18

If one vessel is proceeding up, and another down a narrow channel
at night, and each is keeping to starboard in accordance with Rule 9
(the narrow channel rule), in straight stretches each should of course
see the other's red light, and not its green. But on a winding stretch
it is possible that when one vessel first sights the other she will see the
other's green light and not her red, because the curvature of the
waterway results in the vessels' headings being temporarily at right
angles to each other. This does not mean that the starboard hand rule
will apply. Each vessel is keeping to the starboard side of the fairway,
there is no risk of collision, and only when risk of collision is involved
is the rule applicable. The principle was explained in The Pekin' 9 as
follows:
The cases of the Velocity, the Ranger, and the Oceano have explained
and illustrated the distinction which exists in the effect of the crossing
rule as regards vessels navigating the open sea and those passing along
the winding channels of rivers. The crossing referred to is "crossing so
as to involve a risk of collision" and it is obvious that while two vessels
in certain positions and at certain distances in regard to each other in
the open sea may be crossing so as to involve risk of collision it would
be completely mistaken to take the same view of two vessels in the
same positions and distances in the reaches of a winding river. The
reason, of course, is that the vessels must follow, and must be known
to intend to follow the curves of the river bank. But vessels may, no
doubt, be crossing vessels in a river. It depends on their presumable
courses. If, at any time, two vessels, not end on, are seen, keeping the
courses to be expected with regard to them respectively, to be likely to
arrive at the same point at or nearly at the same moment, they are
vessels crossing so as to involve risk of collision; but they are not so
crossing if the course which is reasonably to be attributed to either
vessel would keep her clear of the other. The question therefore always
' 8Griffin, supra note 4, at 66-67. See also Cockcroft & Lameijer, Collision Avoidance Rules,
supra note 3, at 109.
19(1897) A.C. 532 (P.C.) See also Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road, supra note 1, at 213.
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turns on the reasonable inference to be drawn as to a vessel's future
course from her position at a particular moment, and this greatly
depends on the nature of the locality where she is at that moment.
IV
CROSSING AND OVERTAKING SITUATIONS
DISTINGUISHED
Rule 13(b) provides that a vessel shall be deemed overtaking when
coming up on another vessel from a direction more than 22.50 (two
points) abaft the other vessel's beam, so that at night she would be
able to see only her stem light, and neither of her side lights. It
follows, conversely, that if a vessel is approaching from a direction
abeam of the other vessel, or forward of her beam, or not more than
22.5 abaft her beam, so that at night she would be able to see either
her red or her green side light, but not her stem light, the situation is
a crossing, and not an overtaking one. Thus, if she is coming up on
the other vessel's port side, so that at night she would be able to see
the other vessel's red light, she is the port hand vessel in a crossing
situation and must keep out of the way. Conversely, if she is coming
up on the other vessel's starboard side, so that at night she Would be
able to see her green light, she is the starboard hand vessel, and has
the primary obligation of holding course and speed.
If in doubt as to whether she is overtaking or crossing the vessel
coming up on another must assume that she is overtaking the other,
and must act accordingly. 20 If she is coming up on the port side of the
other, it will make no difference whether it is an overtaking situation
or a crossing one, as in either case she must keep out of the way, and
the other must hold her course and speed. But even if she is coming
up on the other's starboard side and is in doubt, she must keep out of
the way, and not hold her course and speed, as she would be obliged
to do as the starboard hand vessel if the situation were clearly a
crossing one.
A vessel coming up from a position more than 22.50 abaft the beam
vessel ahead remains an overtaking vessel even after she reaches a
position forward of 22.50 abaft the beam. 21Thus, if she is overtaking
the vessel ahead on that vessel's starboard side, she remains a
give-way vessel even after she reaches a point where, at night, she
would be able to see the other vessel's green light and range lights on
2
°Rule
21

13(c).
Rule 13(d).
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her port side, and would no longer be able to see the other vessel's
stern light. This has been described as the "once an overtaking
vessel, always an overtaking vessel" principle.22
It is important to note that this principle applies only when risk of
collision is involved. This was vividly brought out in The Auriga-The
Manuel Campos. 23 The Auriga, proceeding on a course of 2120, was
observed about three miles away, bearing about 100 on the starboard
quarter of the Manuel Campos, which was on a course of 205'.
The courses were thus diverging, and if the Auriga had maintained
her course she would have passed about three miles abeam of the
Manuel Campos. However, when the Auriga was bearing less than
two points abaft the starboard beam of the Manuel Campos, and was
about 2-1/2 miles distant, she altered to 181', which brought her on to
a course converging with that of the Manuel Campos, whose master
and watch officer failed to notice the course change. Those on neither
ship were aware of the danger until the Auriga's stern was on a line
with that of the Manuel Campos, and avoiding action was then
ineffectual to prevent a collision.
The Auriga argued that she was not a burdened vessel bound to
keep out of the way under the overtaking rule because danger of
collision did not exist until she altered course to 1810, and that as she
was then less than two points abaft the beam of the Manuel Campos,
she was a stand-on vessel under the crossing rule. Mr. Justice
Brandon (now Lord Brandon of Oakbrook) agreed. He did, however,
hold the Auriga 60% to blame for making the alteration of course to
181', thereby creating a dangerous situation, and for her failing, as a
stand-on vessel, to take sufficient action under Rule 17 when it
became apparent that the Manuel Campos was not giving way.
Insofar as it holds that the Auriga became a stand-on vessel once
she altered course to 1810 the decision is severely criticized in S.
Harley, Overtaking or Crossing,24 wherein the author states:
An officer-of-the-watch is generally more concerned with looking-out
ahead rather than astern; now it appears that he is required to carefully
watch a vessel coming up astern in order to ascertain whether or not
risk of collision exists, so that if the overtaking vessel is on his
starboard side he will be ready to keep out of her way should risk of
22

See Marsden, Collisions at Sea, supra note 3, at 553.
23[1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 384 (Q.B., Adm. Ct. 1976). Cf. The Nowy Sacz, [1976] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 682 (Q.B., Adm. Ct. 1976) modified [1977] 2 Lloyds Rep. 91 (C.A.). These decisions are
discussed fully in Mukherjee, Overtaking or Crossing: Judicial Interpretation and the Mariner's
Dilemma,
in this issue of the Journal.
24
Safety at Sea International, June 1977.
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collision not be present until the overtaking vessel's bearing has
decreased to less than two points abaft the beam of the overtaken
vessel! Surely the draftsman of the overtaking rule did not intend such
an (impractical) interpretation.
If the overtaking rule were intended to be so constrained then it is
probable that words such as "so as to involve risk of collision" would
have been expressly written into the rule, and the mariner would have
been afforded guidance as to the ascertainment of risk of collision in an
overtaking situation.
In the Auriga the court regarded the ordinary and natural meaning of
the words "coming up with another" (in the definition of an overtaking
vessel, Rule 13) as importing the concept of proximity in space or time
or both. In other words the distance off and speed of approach of the
overtaking vessel are relevant when considering the time of the
application of the overtaking rule. (Now that the visibility distance of a
stern light has been increased by one mile-from two to three milesdoes this mean that Rule 13's radius of application has been increased?).
V
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PORT HAND VESSEL
The port hand vessel's obligations are set out in Rules 15 and 16 of
COLREGS. Rule 16 of the Inland Rules is identical to COLREGS
Rule 16, and Rule 15(a) of the Inland Rules is identical to COLREGS
Rule 15. However, as stated in note 1, supra, Rule 15 of the Inland
Rules includes a paragraph "(b)" which provides that notwithstanding Para. (a), on the Great Lakes, Western Rivers, or other waters
specified by the Secretary of Transportation, a vessel crossing a river
must keep out of the way of an ascending or descending vessel.
Rule 15 of COLREGS and Rule 15(a) of the Inland Rules prohibit
the port hand vessel from crossing ahead under ordinary circumstances, but do not otherwise prescribe how she is to fulfill her
obligation of keeping out of the starboard hand vessel's way. Guidelines are, however, to be found in Rule 8, which sets forth generally
the actions to be taken to avoid collision: if the circumstances admit,
the actions should be positive, timely and in accordance with good
seamanship; alterations of course and speed should be large enough
to be apparent to another vessel observing her visually or by radar;
the action should be such as to result in passing at a safe distance, and
should be carefully checked until the other vessel is past and clear; if
necessary the vessel should slacken speed, or stop and reverse.
Rule 16 provides that the port hand vessel (or any vessel, such as
an overtaking vessel, required to keep out of the way) must so far as
possible take early and substantial action to keep well clear.
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Finally, Rule 17, prescribing the duties of the starboard hand
vessel, concludes with a paragraph "(d)," which makes it clear that
the rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep
out of the way.
VI
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STARBOARD HAND VESSEL
Rule 17 specifies the stand-on vessel's obligations in a crossing
situation. Another rule that frequently becomes applicable is 34(d),
which requires a danger signal of at least five short and rapid blasts
when one approaching vessel fails to understand the intentions or
actions of the other, or is in doubt whether the other is taking
sufficient action to avoid collision. The sound signal may be supplemented by a light signal of at least five short, rapid flashes.
In carrying out her primary obligation to hold her course and speed
the starboard hand vessel has the right to assume at the outset that the
give-way vessel will fulfill her statutory obligation of keeping out of
the way. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
The Exmouth-The Hellenic Beach:
Under ordinary circumstances Hellenic, as the privileged vessel, was
entitled to maintain her course and speed. If Hellenic had to speculate
that Exmouth would not obey the rules and engage in avoiding action on
that assumption, the rules might as25well be discarded. Navigation
would be reduced to a game of bluff.
The most significant change in the crossing rules effected by
COLREGS was the addition of Para. (a)(ii) of Rule 17. Under the
former rules, the stand-on vessel in a crossing situation was frequently placed in a very difficult position when the give-way vessel
failed to take prompt steps to keep out of the way. If the stand-on
vessel took avoiding action before reaching a point where collision
could not be avoided by action on the part of the give-way vessel
alone, she could be held in violation of the first part of old Rule 21,
requiring her to keep her course and speed. 26 On the other hand, if
25253 F.2d 473, 1958 AMC 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1958), citing Wilson v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co.,
276 U.S. 454, 1928 AMC 740 (1928); The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896); National Bulk Carriers
v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 1950 AMC 1293 (2d Cir. 1950); Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v.
United States, 175 F.2d 632, 1949 AMC 1120 (4th Cir. 1949); The Nereus, 23 F. 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1885).
26
See The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130 (1894); Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States (The
Oregon-The New Mexico), 81 F. Supp. 777, 1948 AMC 1727 (E.D. Va. 1948), aftd, 175 F.2d
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she held course and speed beyond the point where the give-way
vessel could not avoid collision by her own actions alone, the
stand-on vessel could be held in violation of the second sentence of
old Rule 21, requiring her to take action at that point. 27 When the old
rules were in force, this meant that where United States or Liberian
law was applicable, the stand-on vessel could be held liable for 50%
of the total damages, no matter how grievous the faults of the
28
give-way may have been.
The old rule was unworkable: it presupposed that the stand-on
vessel was familiar with the maneuvering ability of the give-way
vessel. 29 An estimate of the give-way vessel's capabilities was of
course difficult by day, but virtually impossible at night, when only
the give-way vessel's lights could be seen, and not the vessel herself.
In theory, the stand-on vessel might have inquired by radio about the
give-way vessel's maneuverability, but of course in the brief period of
time that might have been available, a radio message urging the
give-way vessel to obey old Rule 19 and keep out of the way would
have been far more practicable than one asking her to describe her
characteristics.
This mandatory provision has been carried over into COLREGS by
Rule 17(b). This may have been the result of a compromise between
the views of those delegates to the COLREGS diplomatic conference
who wanted to keep the obligations of the stand-on vessel as they
were before COLREGS, and the views of those who wanted to
replace the second part of old Rule 19 with mandatory language
similar to the permissive language eventually included as Rule
17(a)(ii) of COLREGS with respect to action the stand-on vessel may
take upon observing that the give-way vessel is not complying with
the Rules.
In any case, as finally formulated, COLREGS contain two theoretically distinct provisions regarding the rights and obligations of a
stand-on vessel in a crossing situation when confronted with the
failure of a give-way vessel to take prompt steps to keep out of her
way: (1) under Para. (a)(ii) of Rule 17 she may take action to avoid
632, 1949 AMC 1120 (4th Cir. 1949). The courts were, however, generally unwilling to judge too
strictly the conduct of a stand-on vessel confronted with the failure of a give-way vessel to fulfill
her obligation of keeping out of the way. See, e.g., the court of appeals decision in The
Oregon-The New Mexico.
27
Yangtse Ins. Ass'n v. Furness, 215 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1914).
28
The Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170 (1855), overruled in United States v. Reliable
Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).
29
See Cockcroft & Lameijer, Collision Avoidance Rules, supra note 3, at 119.
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collision by her maneuver alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to
her that the give-way vessel is not taking appropriate action; (2) under
Para. (b) of Rule 17 she shall take such action as will best aid in
avoiding collision when she finds herself so close to the give-way
vessel that collision cannot be avoided by the action of that vessel
alone.
The new rules thus give a stand-on vessel a decided benefit, in
permitting her to take action before waiting for the moment to arrive
when a give-way vessel that is failing to give way can no longer avoid
collision by her own action alone. On the other hand, COLREGS, at
least as interpreted by the American and British courts, impose a
correspondingly greater obligation on the stand-on vessel to take
appropriate action to avoid collision with a give-way vessel that is
failing to fulfill her obligation to give way.
Para. (c) of Rule 17 provides that a starboard hand vessel which
takes action under Para. (a)(ii) to avoid collision with the port hand
vessel "shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course
to port for a vessel on her own port side." No corresponding
provision was contained in the former rules, although good seamanship would dictate avoidance of an alteration of course toward the
port hand vessel, except in extraordinary circumstances. Other than
this, and the general guidelines contained in Rule 8 concerning
actions to be taken to avoid collision, the rules do not prescribe the
type of action which should be taken by the starboard hand vessel in
accordance with Para. (a)(ii) of Rule 17.
By its terms Para. (c) of Rule 17 applies only to the action which
may be taken under Para. (a)(ii) when it appears that the port hand
vessel is not taking appropriate action. No similar provision is made
with respect to the mandatory action the stand-on vessel must take
under Para. (b), presumably because that paragraph applies only
when the vessels are so close that an unorthodox maneuverconceivably even an alteration to port toward a give-way vessel on
the port side-may be necessary to avoid collision.
The first reported American decision under the new crossing rules
appears to be American Employers Ins. Co. v. The Menelaus,30 a case

involving factual issues almost exclusively, where, in holding the
give-way vessel solely at fault, the court simply stated:
The only possible negligence which could be attributed to the Menelaus

would be the failure to take evasive action sooner, considering that her
3°Supra note 6.
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attempts to contact the Ann Bonney by radio and by whistle and light
signal went unanswered. We conclude that, considering her duty as a
privileged vessel to maintain course and speed, the Menelaus was not
negligent in failing to alter either course or speed until the collision
seemed imminent. [Citing Gilmore & Black at 504.]
In Matter of Shaun Fisheries, Inc., 31 the Fishing Vessel Shaun
collided with the Barge Bandon, in tow of the Tug Mary Catherine.
The court found that the tug's ability to maneuver was not restricted
within the meaning of COLREGS Rule 18,32 and that as the port hand
vessel in a crossing situation she should have given way to the Shaun,
and was at fault for failing to do so. In holding the Shaun equally to
blame, the court stated:
Even though Shaun did have the right of way, she had the duty to avoid
collision when it became apparent that Mary Catherine was not obeying
the rules of the road. Shaun had ample warning of that fact in Mary
Catherine's steady course and speed throughout the time the vessels
were in sight of each other. As collision became more and more
probable, Shaun could have radioed Mary Catherine and asked her
intentions, or, as the vessels came still closer, have sounded a warning
signal to alert the other ship. Even after Shaun passed abeam of the tug,
she could have turned to port and avoided the collision. COLREG Rule
17 did not require her to hold course until collision became practically
inevitable.
I find that both ships were at fault in failure to give way. Mary
Catherine was obliged to give way under the rules of the road. Shaun
was obliged to avoid collision when Mary Catherinefailed to give way.
It will be noted that the court did not rest its decision holding the
stand-on vessel to blame on a violation of the mandatory provisions
of Para. (b) of Rule 17, but rather on her failure to act when it became
apparent that the tug was not obeying the rules of the road. It is
implicit in the court's language that under the circumstances it
considered a failure to act under Para. 17 (a)(ii) a fault, despite the
permissive wording of that subparagraph.
In Matter of Sieriki Kisen Kaisha,33 the Seiryu, the give-way vessel
in a crossing situation, failed to take any steps to keep out of the way
of the Stena Freighter,the stand-on vessel, until very shortly before
the collision, when she turned to port across the Stena's bow, which
311984 AMC 2650 (D. Ore. 1983).
32

Rule 18 provides, in part, that except as otherwise required by Rules 9, 10 and 13, a
power-driven vessel underway, a sailing vessel underway, and a vessel engaged in fishing, when
underway, shall keep out of the way of a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver.
33629 F. Supp. 1374, 1986 AMC 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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struck the Seiryu's starboard side at a right angle and almost cut her
in two. The Seiryu sank the moment the Stena pulled away, but
fortunately there were no deaths or injuries, the master and crew
having meanwhile climbed aboard the Stena.
The Stena's watch officer testified that he had concluded from
plotting successive positions of the Seiryu on the Stena's radar
reflection plotter that the Seiryu would pass astern of his vessel. He
then busied himself with taking a fix and plotting it on the chart.
About three minutes before the collision he permitted the helmsmanlookout-the only other person on the bridge-to go below to call the
next watch. (The vessel's automatic pilot was in operation.) After
plotting the fix he saw the Seiryu dead ahead, and the vessels collided
as he ran to the controls and put the Stena's variable pitch propeller
levers on "STOP."
The Seiryu confessed fault, but argued that the Stena was also to
blame, because of her failure to maintain a proper lookout, to sound
a danger signal, and to take the avoiding action permitted under Para.
(a)(ii) of Rule 17 and required under Para. 17(b). Pointing to the
Stena's maneuverability, the Seiryu argued that her watch officer
could have stopped his vessel dead in the water in two or three
minutes if he had sounded a danger signal and received no response,
and that in the last minutes before collision would otherwise have
occurred he could have turned the Stena to starboard and passed
astern of the Seiryu. In determining that the Stena was 40% to blame
for the collision the court placed "primary emphasis on her failure to
give a whistle warning signal rather than her failure to make any
specific maneuver. "
The court concluded that the Stena's fault in having both the
helmsman-lookout and the watch officer engage in other activities,
although admittedly aware of the Seiryu's close proximity, was a
violation of COLREGS, and that the Stena's failure to give a warning
signal was a contributing cause of the collision.
The court did not attempt to differentiate between the right to take
avoiding action under Rule 17(a)(ii) and the obligation to take such
action under Rule 17(b). But again, it seems implicit from the court's
discussion of the Stena's faults that had the Stena been maintaining
a proper look-out she should, at the very least, have sounded a danger
signal as soon as it became apparent that the Seiryu, as the port hand
vessel, was not complying with her obligation under COLREGS to
keep out of the Stena's way.
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The Achilleus 34 involved a night-time collision between a vessel of
that name and the Cinderella, in the approaches to Kieler Forde,
while the Achilleus was en route from Finland to Calais and the
Cinderella was on a voyage from Piraeus to Stockholm. At the
material times the vessels were on crossing courses, the Cinderella
being the starboard hand vessel, and the Achilleus the port hand
vessel.
The Achilleus was held 70% to blame, for crossing a traffic
separation zone and for failing to keep out of the way. Both faults
were found to have resulted from her failure to maintain a proper
lookout. The Cinderella had sounded a warning signal, but it was not
heard on the Achilleus, apparently because a proper lookout was not
being maintained. The Cinderellawas held 30% to blame, for failing
to take avoiding action, because, if she had been maintaining a proper
look-out, it should have been apparent to those on board that the
Achilleus was not turning to starboard, but was going to cross ahead
of the starboard hand vessel.
Mr. Justice Sheen quoted Paras. (a)(i), (a)(ii), and (b) of Rule 17.
While in charging the Cinderella with fault he did not specify which
paragraphs of Rule 17 he considered the Cinderella had violated, he
stated:
No one on the bridge of Cinderella appears to have appreciated that
Achilleus had headway and was apparently going to cross ahead of
Cinderella.

Whether Mr. Ohlsson [the Cinderella's mate on watch] was looking
at the radar or keeping a visual lookout, he ought to have observed
what Achilleus was doing. His failure to observe Achilleus shows a
complete lack of a sense of responsibility. When the propeller of
Cinderellawas put to full astern mode Achilleus cannot have been more
than half a cable distant. Long before that moment it should have been
apparent that Achilleus was not taking appropriate action to comply
with r. 15.
Again, it will be observed that Sheen, J. did not charge the
Cinderellawith fault on the basis of a failure to take avoiding action
when the vessels were so close that action by the Achilleus alone
could not have prevented the collision. Rather, he noted the advice of
the experts that long before the Cinderella'spropeller was put to full
astern mode it should have been apparent that the Achilleus was not
complying with her Rule 15 obligation to keep out of the way, and that
the Cinderellashould then have taken off her headway. It is therefore
34[1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 338 (Q.B., Adm. Ct. 1985).
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clear that he considered the Cinderella at fault for failure to take
avoiding action in accordance with Para. (a)(ii) of Rule 17, even
though that paragraph is worded as permitting such action, rather
than as requiring it.
Still another decision treating a stand-on vessel's failure to take the
avoiding action permitted under Rule 17(a)(ii) as a fault is In re Ocean
Foods Boat Co. 35 The Fishing Vessel McKinley, the give-way vessel
in a crossing situation, collided with the M/V Tosca. Both vessels
were held at fault, the McKinley for failing to give way and for
attempting to cross the Tosca's bow, and the Tosca for failing to take
avoiding action. In charging the Tosca with 35% of the blame, the
court quoted both Para. (a)(ii) and Para. (b) of Rule 17, and continued:
Rule 17 allowed the Tosca to take unilateral action to avoid the collision
once it became apparent that the McKinley was not following the rules
and that the Tosca's maneuver was necessary to avoid collision. The
Tosca failed to take such action. She must accept some responsibility

for the collision.

CONCLUSION
From the American and British decisions concerning the rights and
obligations of the stand-on vessel in a crossing situation handed down
since COLREGS entered into force in 1977, three principles may be
deduced:
1. As soon as it becomes apparent that the port hand vessel is not
taking prompt steps to keep out of the way, the starboard hand vessel
must sound the warning signal of five or more short, rapid blasts
which Rule 34 (d) requires a vessel approaching another to sound if
from any cause she fails to understand the intentions or actions of the
other, or is in doubt whether sufficient action is being taken by the
other to avoid collision.
2. While Para. (a)(ii) of Rule 17 is worded permissively, a stand-on
vessel will be chargeable with some degree of blame if she stubbornly
persists in holding course and speed after it has, or should have
become apparent to her that the give-way vessel is not taking
35692 F. Supp. 1253, 1989 AMC 580 (D. Ore. 1988).
See also Rich Ocean Car Carriers, S.A. v. The Sanko Diamond, 1989 AMC 220 (M.D. Fla.
1988), where the court found the stand-on vessel 15% to blame for failing to sound the danger
signal required by Rule 34(d) when it appeared that sufficient action was not being taken by the
give-way vessel to avoid collision, and for failing to take avoiding action "in ample time," as
required by Rule 8.
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appropriate action, even if it is possible to demonstrate that the
vessels were not then so close that action by the give-way vessel
alone could not avoid collision, and that the mandatory provisions of
Para. (b) of Rule 17 were therefore not yet applicable.
3. The stand-on vessel will of course be held at least partially to
blame for a collision contributed to by her violation of Para. (b) of
Rule 17, in failing to take appropriate avoiding action when the
vessels are so close that the give-way vessel cannot avoid collision by
her own action alone.
Cockcroft & Lameijer's analysis of the four stages in a collision
situation is particularly appropriate as an outline of the respective
rights and obligations of vessels on crossing courses:
When two vessels in sight of each other are approaching with no change
of compass bearing, so that when there is risk of collision one of them
is required to keep out of the way by a Rule from Section II, there may
be four stages relating to the permitted or required action for each
vessel:
1. At long range, before risk of collision exists, both vessels are free
to take any action.
2. When risk of collision first begins to apply the give-way vessel is
required to take early and substantial action to achieve a safe passing
distance and the other vessel must keep her course and speed.
3. When it becomes apparent that the give-way vessel is not taking
appropriate action in compliance with the Rules the stand-on vessel is
required to give the whistle signal prescribed in Rule 34(d) and is
permitted to take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, but
a power-driven vessel must not alter course to port to avoid another
power-driven vessel crossing from her own port side. The give-way
vessel is not relieved of her obligation to keep out of the way.
4. When collision cannot be avoided by the give-way vessel alone
the stand-on vessel is required to take such action as will best aid to
avoid collision.
The distances at which the various stages begin to apply will vary
considerably. They will be much greater for high speed vessels involved in a meeting or fine crossing situation than for vessels involved
in an overtaking situation. For a crossing situation involving two
power-driven vessels in the open sea it is suggested that the outer limit
of the second stage might be of the order of 5 to 8 miles and
that the
outer limit for the third stage would be about 2 to 3 miles. 36

36

Cockcroft & Lameijer, Collision Avoidance Rules, supra note 3, at 124-125.
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Rules Relating to the Crossing Situation

Rule 15. Crossing situation
When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk
of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard
side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the
case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.
Rule 16. Action by give-way vessel
Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another
vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial action to
keep well clear.
Rule 17. Action by stand-on vessel
(a)(i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other
shall keep her course and speed.
(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by
her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that
the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate
action in compliance with these Rules.
(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course
and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by
the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action
as will best aid to avoid collision.
(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation
in accordance with subparagraph (a)(ii) of this Rule to avoid
collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on
her own port side.
(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation
to keep out of the way.

